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THE MIXED UP EXERCISE OF ADMIRALTY
JURISDICTION OVER MIXED CONTRACTS,
NAMELY UMBRELLA INSURANCE POLICIES
COVERING SHORE-SIDE AND SEA-SIDE RISKS
Philip Michael Powell Esq.∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Given the broad-ranging implications associated with having a
dispute decided by a federal court pursuant to the court’s admiralty
jurisdiction, potential parties to a dispute have strong motivations to
either avoid a court sitting in admiralty or ensure the court hears the
controversy under the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction.
Prior to 2004, the legal test used by courts to determine whether or
not they could hear a contractual dispute involving a contract with both
maritime and non-maritime elements (“mixed contract”) pursuant to their
admiralty jurisdiction was relatively straight forward. Under that test, a
court could exercise admiralty jurisdiction to hear a mixed contractual
dispute where the non-maritime portion of the contract was (1) merely
incidental to the overall contract or (2) the non-maritime portion of the
contract could be separated from the maritime portion of the contract.1
According to the above test, where the maritime and non-maritime
claims were bound together and could not be separated, the court would
dismiss the entire case, even the maritime portion of the contract, for a
lack of admiralty jurisdiction.2 This test was relatively straight forward
and fairly easy to apply to contractual disputes. However, in 2004, the
U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in Norfolk Southern
Railway Co. v. Kirby, whereby the jurisdictional test was fundamentally
∗ Phil M. Powell is an admiralty attorney at Fowler Rodriguez in New Orleans,
La. For their support, encouragement, and guidance, Phil would like to thank his family,
Martin Davies, Robert Force, and Harold Flanagan.
1. Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba v. Snobl, 363 F.2d 733, 735-36 (4th Cir. 1965).
2. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 3-10 (4th ed. 2004);
see also Brocsonic Co. v. M/V Mathilde Maersk, 270 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2001).
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changed.3 The rule asserted by the Court in Kirby focused on the
maritime portions of the mixed contract and, according to this new test, a
court could decide a contractual dispute involving a mixed contract under
the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction where the maritime portions of
the contract were substantial, even when the dispute centered on nonmaritime elements of the contract.4 Whereas the Court’s jurisdictional
approach to mixed contracts as asserted in Kirby may have made sense
with regard to contracts for multi-modal transportation, the application of
the test by Circuit Courts has provided anything but uniformity or
predictability with regard to other types of mixed contracts.
This lack of uniformity or predictability in the application of the
general maritime law through the exercise of courts’ admiralty
jurisdiction is not a desirable outcome, especially as a predominant goal
of admiralty practice in American courts has always been uniformity.
This judicial emphasis on uniformity is best explained in the Supreme
Court’s decision in The Lottawanna where the Court specifically stated:
One thing, however, is unquestionable; the Constitution must
have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating
uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have been
the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under
the disposal and regulation of the several States, as that would
have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the
Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character
affecting the intercourse of the States with each other or with
foreign states.5
Given this disparity in the several Circuit Courts’ application of the
Kirby test for mixed contracts, and the broad goal of admiralty
jurisdiction to provide uniformity in its application of the general
maritime law,6 the application of the Kirby test should be limited to
multi-modal transportation contracts. With regard to other types of mixed
contracts, the courts should take a different approach, specifically
tailored to determine the substantiality of the maritime elements of that
particular type of contract. The above approach would better facilitate
the uniformity and predictability of maritime practice that courts have
aspired to maintain since the beginning of the federal system of
government in the United States.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14 (2004).
Id. at 27.
The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 575 (1874).
Id.
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As such, this Article examines the three main types of contracts
confronted by the courts in their application of the rule asserted in Kirby.
These three main types of contracts include: (1) multi-modal
transportation contracts exemplified by “through-bills of lading” (and
other contracts with objective geographic elements); (2) master service
agreements or blanket contracts common in the offshore oil rig context;
and (3) umbrella or bumbershoot insurance policies that provide
coverage for both shore-side and maritime risks. While master service
agreements and multi-modal transportation contracts will be discussed
herein, much of the jurisdictional confusion has been centered on mixed
coverage insurance policies; therefore, this Article will focus on that
issue area.
In examining the application of the modern jurisdictional test for the
aforementioned mixed contract types, this Article will begin by
investigating the basis for the courts’ admiralty jurisdiction, looking at
the historical, constitutional, statutory, and precedential origin of modern
jurisprudence over admiralty jurisdiction. Through this prism, this
Article will discuss the impact the Supreme Court’s decision in Kirby
had on the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction over mixed contracts. By
looking at the various Circuit Courts’ applications of the Kirby test, this
Article seeks to illustrate the confusion the Supreme Court’s decision in
Kirby has caused. Based on this examination, this Article asserts that
courts have done an altogether inadequate job of formulating a uniform,
cohesive, and predictable rule or set of rules with which to determine
which marine insurance contracts—that provide both sea-side and shoreside risk coverage—are sufficiently “salty”7 to justify the exercise of
admiralty jurisdiction for resolving controversies arising from such
policies.
Additionally, this Article argues that given the magnitude of the
implications associated with the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction in
resolution of contractual disputes, such as the use of general maritime
law or the availability of admiralty-specific procedural devices, the
Supreme Court has done the maritime industry a great disservice in its
failure to formulate an understandable and applicable set of jurisdictional
rules. As such, commercial interests would be better served by a
coherent, uniform, and predictable rule or set of rules so as to more
effectively negotiate and draft contracts and resolve disputes derived
therefrom. Given this reality, the Kirby rule should be limited in its
application to multi-modal transportation contracts and other contracts
involving an element of geographic movement or insurance coverage
7. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742 (1961).
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thereof and master service agreements, as applied in Grand Isle
Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC.8 But with regard to mixed
insurance policies, the Supreme Court should follow the Second Circuit’s
approach as discussed herein.9
II. HISTORICAL, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND STATUTORY BASIS FOR
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
The roots of American jurisprudence on admiralty jurisdiction and
substantive maritime law were inherited from English law.10 Whereas
prior to American independence, many maritime disputes were decided
by Vice Admiralty Courts, after the revolution and under the Articles of
Confederation, there was no national judiciary and each state exercised
sovereign powers, setting up state courts, including admiralty courts, and
individual laws that created a very disjointed system in terms of maritime
law.11 As such, given the above experience and the fact that the legal
issues and implications associated with maritime commerce and industry
necessarily involved, and still involve, international relations, foreign
trade, interstate commerce and trade, and potentially the rights of foreign
citizens, uniformity of maritime law was then, and has remained, a goal
of the judiciary.12 This judicial interest in uniformity of maritime law,
based on the national interests involved, was as relevant during the time
of the Founders as it is today, and in order to better facilitate uniformity,
the Founders believed the Federal Judiciary, rather than those of the
several states, was the best body to adjudicate maritime issues.13
Alexander Hamilton went so far as to say,
[t]he most bigoted idolizers of State authority have not thus far
shown a disposition to deny the national judiciary the
cognizances of maritime causes. These so generally depend on
the laws of nations, and so commonly affect the rights of
foreigners, that they fall within the considerations which are
relative to the public peace.14
8. 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009).
9. See infra Section III(C)(2)(c).
10. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, § 1-6.
11. Id.
12. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917) (citing The Lottawanna, 88 U.S.
558, 575 (1874).
13. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
14. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ.
Press 2009).
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Based on the above, it was clear from the outset of the judiciary and
the United States that the need for federal judicial authority to occupy the
field with regard to maritime law for the sake of uniformity outweighed
the interests of the individual states.
In response to the above experience, the drafters of the U.S.
Constitution enumerated that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend . . . to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”15 Because Article III of
the Constitution only defined the judicial authority of the Supreme Court,
Congress was forced to use its Constitutional authority “[t]o constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,”16 and further confer admiralty
jurisdiction to those inferior courts, which it first did in the Judiciary Act
of 1789.17 Substantively, the verbiage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 has
remained unchanged and is now codified.18 The original wording of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 held that:
the district courts shall have, exclusively of the courts of the
several States . . . exclusive original cognizance of all civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all
seizures under laws of impost, navigation or trade of the United
States, where the seizures are made, on waters which are
navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen,
within their respective districts as well as upon the high seas;
saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy,
where the common law is competent to give it. . . .19
Much like that of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the wording of the modern
incantation of the above statute holds that:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of
the courts of the States, of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction,
saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they
are otherwise entitled.
(2) Any prize brought into the United States and all
proceedings for the condemnation of property taken as
prize.20

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, ch. 20, § 9.
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012).
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, ch. 20, § 9.
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012).
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Given the political and legislative history of the current grant of subject
matter jurisdiction, it is plain that the intent of the above was to ensure
that federal courts have jurisdiction over disputes concerning maritime
matters in order to ensure uniformity.21 It is based on the above
historical, constitutional, and statutory basis that federal district and
appellate courts are legally able to exercise jurisdiction over “all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”22
III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
As is alluded to above, Article Three of the United States
Constitution created the Federal Judiciary by vesting “[t]he judicial
Power of the United States . . . in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”23 In addition to the Constitutional creation of the Supreme
Court and grant of power given to Congress to establish inferior
tribunals,24 the Constitution also provided the legal basis for the federal
courts’ exercise of jurisdiction. In doing so, the U.S. Constitution holds
that the judicial authority of Federal courts:
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority; to all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to
Controversies between two or more States; between a State and
Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States;
between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants
of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”25
In addition to the above grant of subject matter jurisdiction, the U.S.
Constitution also specifies that with regard to the original and appellate
jurisdictions of the Supreme Court:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 575 (1874).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases
before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.26
Based on this Constitutional framework, and the Congressional power to
“constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,”27 there are
historically and currently three bases for federal subject matter
jurisdiction. These include: 1) federal question jurisdiction,28 2) diversity
jurisdiction,29 and 3) admiralty jurisdiction.30
The designation of jurisdictional basis, under which a federal court
may hear a claim, is significant because it affects the choice of law in
deciding the suit and the availability of certain procedural rules in
litigating the controversy. Accordingly, where a claim is based on “the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” a federal court has
original jurisdiction to hear the claim based on its federal question
jurisdiction and will decide the claim applying the law in controversy.31
Alternatively, where a claim involves litigants of diverse citizenship and
an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000, a court may hear the
case pursuant to its diversity jurisdiction.32 Unlike the courts’ choice of
law in a federal question claim, when the court hears a case pursuant to
its diversity jurisdiction, the court will apply the substantive state law of
the forum in determining the rights and remedies of the parties.33 Finally,
where a dispute is heard by a court sitting in admiralty, pursuant to its
admiralty jurisdiction, the parties have available to them, or are subject
to, substantive maritime law and procedural rules of admiralty that are
unique to admiralty and maritime law and give rise to significant legal
implications.34
Because the exercise of a court’s admiralty jurisdiction to hear
maritime cases is accompanied by significant legal implications, parties
have strong motivations to either avoid federal courts sitting in admiralty
or ensure the court hears the dispute while sitting in admiralty. Some of
the aforementioned legal implications include: 1) the availability of
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012).
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012).
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“Federal Admiralty Common Law,”35 exemplified by a lack of a Statute
of Frauds;36 2) a significant amount of judge-made substantive maritime
law due to a lack of Congressional legislation in the area of maritime
law;37 3) the availability of theoretically less biased life-tenured judges;38
4) the availability of a bench trial before a sophisticated judge with
expertise in admiralty and maritime law rather than a jury;39 5) the
availability of maritime liens40 and the corresponding ability to bring a
suit In Rem;41 6) the ability to bring a suit Quasi In Rem and attach
unrelated property of the defendant;42 7) presumptive validity and
enforceability of contractual choice of law clauses;43 8) the availability of
the principle of general average to disperse damages among parties to a
common adventure;44 and 9) the general maritime law doctrine of
laches.45 Based on the aforementioned legal implications arising of the
courts’ exercise of their admiralty jurisdiction and the accompanying
application of substantive and procedural rules particular to maritime
law, uniform, cohesive, and predictable jurisdictional rules should be a
desired result of any court seeking to fashion tests for whether the
exercise of admiralty jurisdiction is appropriate.
IV. JUDICIAL RULES ASSOCIATED WITH ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
While the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes have provided the
legal basis and framework for the Federal Judiciary’s exercise of
admiralty jurisdiction over matters of admiralty and maritime law, the
vast majority of jurisdictional rules are judge made. With regard to
35. GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY (2d ed.
2001).
36. Selame Assocs., Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 412 (D. Mass. 1978);
Keller v. U.S., 557 F. Supp. 1218 (D.N.H. 1983); Vieira v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 1998
WL 1085912 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
37. Robert J. Gruendel & Angelique M. Crain, The Maritime Contract and Admiralty
Jurisdiction: Recent Developments Help Clarify an Inherently Confused Landscape, 77
TUL. L. REV. 1235, 1238 (2003).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, § 9-1.
41. FED. R. CIV. P. C.
42. FED. R. CIV. P. B.
43. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Port of New Orleans, 418
F. App’x 305, 309 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) PLC v. Durham
Auctions, Inc., 585 F.3d 236, 242 (5th Cir. 2009)).
44. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, § 17-2.
45. Id. § 5-23.
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admiralty jurisdiction, the rules the Supreme Court has created to decide
whether it has jurisdiction to decide on a case depends on the basis of the
claim. The judicially-created jurisdictional test the Court applies to
determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction under its admiralty
jurisdiction depends on whether the cause of action arises out of a tort
claim or a contractual dispute.
A. Admiralty Jurisdiction: Tort
Because much of the American admiralty common law has its roots
in English admiralty law,46 certain vestiges of that heritage remain in
modern American admiralty jurisprudence. However, for various
reasons, there are several departures from English law. Notably
American courts have relied less on the English courts’ emphasis on
location in testing whether said courts may exercise admiralty
jurisdiction. Unlike English courts, which base their jurisdiction over tort
purely on location, such that the English court will only exercise
admiralty jurisdiction over a controversy where the tort takes place
within the “ebb and flow” of the tide,47 American courts have adhered to
a location- and nexus-based test.
As such, where the cause of action is based on tort, the court will use
a two prong location and nexus test developed in trilogy of cases:
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland,48 Foremost Insurance
Co. v. Richardson,49 and Sisson v. Ruby.50 This test was later definitively
articulated by the Supreme Court in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.51 In Grubart, the Court focused on the
location of the tortious conduct that gave rise to the injury to determine
whether it was able to exercise admiralty jurisdiction over a tort claim.52
In doing so the Court held that the locational aspect of the two-part
jurisdictional test was satisfied where “the tort occurred on navigable
water or . . . [the] injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on
navigable water.”53 The Court went on to hold that the nexus portion of
the jurisdictional test for the court’s exercise of admiralty jurisdiction to
decide a tort claim was satisfied where, given the “general features of the
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. § 1-6.
Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 457-58 (1851).
409 U.S. 249 (1972).
457 U.S. 668 (1982).
497 U.S. 358 (1990).
513 U.S. 527 (1995).
Id. at 534.
Id.
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type of incident involved,”54 the incident has “a potentially disruptive
impact on maritime commerce” and the “general character” of the
“activity giving rise to the incident” shows a “substantial relationship to
traditional maritime activity.”55
B. Admiralty Jurisdiction: Contract
Like the American jurisdictional test for tort, the American
jurisdictional test for contracts also differs from that of English
jurisprudence. According to the old test propagated by English law, a
court sitting in admiralty may only exercise jurisdiction to decide a
dispute when the contract was “made upon the sea and to be executed
thereon.”56 Unlike the English jurisdictional test for torts and contracts,
and the American jurisdictional test for tort, both of which focus on
locale in determining whether or not a court may exercise its admiralty
jurisdiction to hear a claim, American courts use a more conceptual
approach with regard to the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction over
contractual disputes.57 For this reason, when the cause of action arises
out of a contractual dispute, the court focuses on the nature and subject
matter of a contract, rather than the location of where the contract was
created or to be performed, to determine if the court may exercise its
admiralty jurisdiction in order to decide a maritime contractual dispute.58
This marks a vast departure for American jurisprudence from its
English heritage. The American tradition of focusing on the subject
matter and nature of the contact rather than the location of the contract or
the dispute had its roots in Delovio v. Boit,59 where Justice Joseph Story
pronounced:
[t]he delegation of cognizance of “all civil cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction” to the courts of the United States
comprehends all maritime contracts, torts, and injuries. The latter
branch is necessarily bounded by locality; the former extends
over all contracts, (wheresoever they may be made or executed,
or whatsoever may be the form of the stipulations,) which relate
to the navigation, business or commerce of the sea.60
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. (citing Sisson, 497 U.S. at 363).
Id.
New Eng. Mut. Marine Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. 1, 26 (1870).
See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735 (1961).
DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
Id.
Id.

2015]

Mixed Contracts

11

This position was further entrenched as American jurisprudence in the
Supreme Court’s watershed case New England Mutual Marine Ins. Co. v.
Dunham.61 In New England Mutual Marine Ins. Co., the Court was asked
to decide whether a marine insurance contract was one falling under the
Court’s admiralty jurisdiction. In so deciding, Justice Joseph P. Bradley
wrote:
[a]s to contracts, it has been equally well settled that the English
rule which concedes jurisdiction, with a few exceptions, only to
contracts made upon the sea and to be executed thereon (making
locality the test) is entirely inadmissible, and that the true
criterion is the nature and subject-matter of the contract, as
whether it was a maritime contract, having reference to maritime
service or maritime transactions.62
The Court expanded on this notion in Kossick v. United Fruit Co.63 by
pronouncing that in determining whether a contract was a maritime
contract or not, “[t]he only question is whether the transaction relates to
ships and vessels, masters and mariners, as the agents of commerce.”64 It
was from these jurisdictional decrees that the modern rule was derived,
holding that the court may exercise admiralty jurisdiction over a contract
so long as it was a maritime contract, such that the subject matter of the
contract must be “relating to a ship in its use as such, or to commerce or
navigation on navigable waters, or to transportation by sea or to maritime
employment.”65
However, because this jurisdictional test is conceptually amorphous
and overly academic in nature, courts have had to resort to a case-bycase-based inquiry to determine which contracts were “salty”66 enough to
be classified as maritime contracts deserving of admiralty jurisdiction. In
so doing, the courts look at the subject matter of the contract, but they are
also heavily dependent upon judicial precedent in determining the
“contours of admiralty contract jurisdiction.”67
61. New Eng. Mut. Marine Ins. Co., 78 U.S. at 20.
62. Id.
63. 365 U.S. 731 (1961).
64. Id. at 736.
65. J.A.R., Inc. v. M/V Lady Lucille, 963 F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Thurmond v. Delta Well Surveyors, 836 F.2d 952, 954 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting 1 E.
JHIRAD, A. SANN, B. CHASE & M. CHYNSKY, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 183, at 11-6 (7th
ed. 1985)).
66. See Kossick, 365 U.S. at 742.
67. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, § 3-10; see also Exxon Corp. v. Cent. Gulf Lines,
Inc., 500 U.S. 603 (1991).
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Given the above, courts have determined that the following contracts
have a “genuinely salty flavor”68 justifying the exercise of admiralty
jurisdiction over the disputes arising therefrom: 1) marine insurance
contracts;69 2) contracts for the carriage of goods or affreightment;70 3)
charter party agreements;71 4) service contracts for cargo or vessels
(including stevedoring services);72 5) container lease agreements;73 6)
contracts for vessel repair and conversion;74 7) shipboard employment
contracts;75 and 8) towage and salvage contracts.76 Conversely, the
courts have declined to exercise admiralty jurisdiction over the following
contracts due to their lack of the requisite “saltiness”77: 1) contracts for
the building and sale of a vessel;78 2) certain agency contracts;79 3)
contracts for the storage of cargo;80 and 4) certain preliminary contracts
(i.e., bond securing performance of a charter party81 and marine
insurance brokerage contract). 82
Based on the modern jurisdictional rule and the plethora of
precedential law, courts have provided an adequately uniform approach
to the exercise of their admiralty jurisdiction in resolving contractual
disputes. This uniformity has provided parties to both maritime and nonmaritime contracts a desirable level of foreseeability and predictability
with respect to which law will apply and what procedural and legal
effects they will encounter in the event that a dispute arises out of the
contract. With regard to mixed contracts, those contracts containing both

68. See Kossick, 365 U.S. at 742.
69. New Eng. Mut. Marine Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. 1, 1 (1870).
70. Ex parte Easton, 95 U.S. 68, 72 (1877).
71. Kirno Hill Corp. v. Holt, 618 F.2d 982, 984 (2d Cir. 1980).
72. Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355 (1962).
73. CTI-Container Leasing Corp. v. Oceanic Operations Corp., 682 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.
1982).
74. N. Pac. S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine Ry. & Shipbuilding Co., 249 U.S. 119
(1919).
75. Clinton v. Int’l Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots of Am., Inc., 254 F.2d 370 (9th
Cir. 1958).
76. Sea Lift, Inc. v. Refinadora Costarricense de Petroleo, S.A., 792 F.2d 989 (11th
Cir. 1986); Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638 (1900).
77. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742 (1961).
78. People’s Ferry Co. of Boston v. Beers, 61 U.S. 393 (1857); Herman Family
Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2001).
79. Exxon Corp. v. Cent. Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603 (1991).
80. Pillsbury Flour Mills Co. v. Interlake S.S. Co., 40 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1930).
81. Rhederei Actien Gesellschaft Oceana v. Clutha Shipping Co., 226 F. 339 (D. Md.
1915).
82. Angelina Cas. Co. v. Exxon Corp., U.S.A., 876 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1989).
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maritime and non-maritime elements,83 the conceptual approach has been
greatly complicated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Norfolk
Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby 84
C. Admiralty Jurisdiction: Mixed Contracts Generally
A “mixed contract” is one that contains both maritime and nonmaritime elements.85 This very academic approach to whether a contract
has enough of a “genuinely salty flavor”86 for maritime jurisdiction has
presented difficulty for the courts in ascertaining whether the exercise of
admiralty jurisdiction is proper with respect to mixed contracts. Defining
the outer limits and scope of admiralty jurisdiction regarding contracts
that contain both maritime and non-maritime elements has been
described as “not the model of clarity.”87
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kirby, the test for whether a
court could exercise admiralty jurisdiction over a mixed contract focused
on the non-maritime elements of the contract. The now-overruled test
held that where the non-maritime part of the contract (1) was merely
incidental or (2) could be separated from the maritime portion of the
contract, the court would exercise admiralty jurisdiction.88 Where,
however, the maritime and non-maritime claims were bound together and
could not be separated, the Court would refuse to exercise admiralty
jurisdiction in order to hear the dispute, even as to disputes arising out of
the maritime elements of the contract.89
However, this now-antiquated jurisdictional test for mixed contracts
that focused on the non-maritime elements of the contracts was
completely abrogated by the Supreme Court in its 2004 decision, Norfolk
Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby. In Kirby, the Supreme Court changed the
jurisdictional landscape of federal courts with regard to admiralty
jurisdiction and mixed contracts containing both maritime and nonmaritime elements, shifting the focus of the jurisdictional inquiry away
from the non-maritime elements and instead focusing on the
substantiality of the maritime elements.90
83. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, at 139.
84. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14 (2004).
85. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, at 139.
86. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742 (1961).
87. Robert Force, The Aftermath of Norfolk Southern Railway v. James N. Kirby, Pty
Ltd.: Jurisdiction and Choice-of-Law Issues, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (2009).
88. Kirby, 543 U.S. at 23-24.
89. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, at 139.
90. Kirby, 543 U.S. at 23-24.
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1. Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Kirby
Kirby involved a contract for the carriage of goods (machinery) from
Sydney, Australia to Huntsville, Alabama.91 The bill of lading was a
through-bill and initially issued by a freight forwarder, covering the
entire journey, designating Sydney, Australia as the port of loading,
Savannah, Georgia as the port of discharge, and Huntsville, Alabama as
the ultimate destination of delivery.92 The freight forwarder then
contracted with a carrier that issued its own bill of lading designating the
same ports of loading and discharge and ultimate destination.93 The
carrier then contracted with Norfolk Southern Railway to handle the land
leg of the carriage.94 The freight forwarder’s bill of lading included a
Himalaya Clause extending the carrier’s protections to others involved in
the transaction, but it did so at a rate higher than that of Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) ($500 per package); additionally, the
second bill of lading issued by the carrier also included a Himalaya
Clause, but it included a liability limitation extending the carrier’s
protections to others involved in the transaction, and it did so at the
limitation specified in COGSA ($500 per package).95 While in route
from Savannah, Georgia to Huntsville, Alabama the train derailed and
caused damage to the machinery shipped by the claimant.96
Strictly regarding the jurisdictional aspect of Kirby, the Court was
asked to decide “whether or not a suit brought to recover damages for
property that was damaged on land while it was being transported by an
overland carrier pursuant to a marine bill of lading [fell] within admiralty
jurisdiction.”97 In answering the jurisdictional question, the Court looked
to Exxon Corp. v. Century Gulf Lines, Inc.,98 which held that “[t]he trend
in modern admiralty case law . . . is to focus the jurisdictional inquiry
upon whether the nature of the transaction was maritime.”99 However,
the Court went further and disregarded the old jurisdictional test
requiring that either the non-maritime aspect of the contract be either

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id.
500 U.S. 603 (1991).
Id. at 611.
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incidental to the contract or separable from the maritime elements100 and
instead chose to create a new test for determining whether it may
exercise admiralty jurisdiction over a dispute involving a mixed
contract.101
According to the Court’s new rule, the focus was no longer on the
non-maritime aspects of the contract. Instead, the Court held that
exercise of admiralty jurisdiction over a mixed contract turned on the
substantiality of the maritime aspects of the contract.102 Where the
maritime aspects of the contract are “substantial,” the court may exercise
admiralty jurisdiction over any dispute derived of that contract.103 The
new rule proffered in Kirby has come to be known as the “primary
objective test,”104 such that where the primary objective of the contract is
maritime commerce, the court will exercise admiralty jurisdiction over
the dispute despite the fact that the dispute may arise out of a shore-side
incident.105
In so deciding, the Court ruled that it could exercise its admiralty
jurisdiction over the contractual dispute. While this outcome and the
resulting rule make perfect sense when applied to mixed contracts for
multi-modal transportation of goods or warehouse to warehouse cargo
insurance policies, both of which revolve around the carriage of goods
over land and sea legs, the same rule is not as easily applied to mixed
contracts that do not involve an objective geographical, distance-related
aspect, such as umbrella insurance policies. The determination of
whether the maritime element of a mixed contract is substantial is
significantly easier to apply when a court is able to compare mileages or
examine whether the primary objective of the contract necessarily
involved insurance coverage of goods or transportation of goods over the
ocean. Moreover, the Kirby approach may even be viable with regard to
master service agreements, in so far as a court is able to look to the
“focus of the contract.”106 Conversely, determining the substantiality of
the maritime elements of a mixed contract not involving movement of
100. Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, Sociadad Anonima v. Snobl, 363 F.2d 733,
735-36 (4th Cir. 1966).
101. Kirby, 543 U.S. at 23-27.
102. Id. at 26-27.
103. Id. at 27.
104. Sentry Select Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 481 F.3d 1208, 1218 (9th Cir.
2007).
105. Kirby, 543 U.S. at 27.
106. Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778, 800 (5th Cir.
2009).

16

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:1

the subject of the contract has been far more beguiling of a concept and
has proven to be a significantly more difficult task for courts to
accomplish.
2. Application of the Kirby Rule
Much of the application of the jurisdictional test set out in Kirby has
revolved around three areas, which include: (1) multi-modal transport
contracts (carriage contemplated over sea and land like that litigated in
Kirby), (2) master service contracts (also commonly called “blanket
contracts”), and 3) bumbershoot or umbrella insurance policies (umbrella
policies that provide primary or excess coverage for both maritime and
shore-side risks). While these types of mixed contracts are the most
litigated in reference to jurisdictional questions, they by no means form
an exhaustive list of mixed contracts in which jurisdictional questions
arise. As examined below, the courts are anything but uniform in their
application of the Kirby test in determining whether they may properly
exercise admiralty jurisdiction over the disputes arising out of the
aforementioned common types of mixed contracts.107
a. Multi-Modal Transportation Contracts
Disputes over multi-modal transportation contracts involve the exact
same types of dispute as was the case in Kirby, contemplating the
carriage of goods over land and sea legs. The Kirby Rule holds that
where the maritime portion of the contract is substantial, such that the
primary objective of the contract is maritime commerce, then the fact
that the contract also involves non-maritime elements does not affect a
court’s ability to exercise admiralty jurisdiction over a dispute arising
from that contract.108 Furthermore, determining whether the maritime
107. It is worth mentioning that courts have not been willing to extend admiralty
jurisdiction to contractual issues associated with damages for breach of contract (like
payment of demurrage and detention costs), where the contract was primarily for the sale
of goods, but it contemplated that the seller would ship the sold goods. See e.g.
Alphamate Commodity GMBH v. CHS Europe SA, 627 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2010). This is
worth noting as these disputes involve very typical maritime issues, such as the payment
of demurrage or detention cost pursuant to a voyage charter party, yet the court refuses to
exercise its admiralty jurisdiction over disputes over such contracts. This seems
counterintuitive as the contract for the sale of goods contemplates the transportation of
the goods, the inclusion of the transportation terms are material to the contract of the sale
of goods, and it would not be consummated but for the transportation of those goods to
the buyer.
108. Kirby, 543 U.S. at 23-24.
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element of a mixed contract is substantial is significantly easier to apply
when a court is able to compare mileages or examine whether the
primary objective of a given contract involved insurance coverage of
goods or transportation of goods over the ocean. As a result, the
jurisdictional test handed down in Kirby is not only very applicable in
determining jurisdiction in these disputes, it also provides a level of
foreseeability and predictability to parties to multi-modal transportation
contracts, such that there are no surprises as to under which jurisdiction
the court will hear a dispute.
Much like multi-modal transportation contracts, open cargo
insurance policies—providing warehouse to warehouse coverage—
present situations that have objectively measurable geographic elements
that make the jurisdictional test delivered in Kirby easily applied. In fact,
with regard to a court’s jurisdictional inquiry, warehouse to warehouse
cargo insurance policies are more like multi-modal transportation
contracts than they are like umbrella insurance policies. Following Kirby,
the Eleventh Circuit cited in a footnote that open cargo policies that
include warehouse to warehouse clauses are maritime policies.109 This is
the case, like multi-modal transportation contracts, because a substantial
portion of the contract is devoted to the coverage of cargo over the sealeg of transit. The best example of this assertion is the Tenth Circuit
jurisdictional analysis in Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Sea
Harvest Seafood Co.110 Even though this case was decided prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Kirby, the court’s analysis is remarkably
similar to that which could be expected of a similar legal issue postKirby.
In Commercial Union Insurance Co., the insurer brought an action
for a declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that it was not liable
under a marine open cargo insurance policy for loss of 36,000 pounds of
decomposed frozen shrimp.111 Prior to the above-cited controversy, Sea
Harvest had contracted with Commercial Union for an ocean marine
open cargo policy.112 The policy purported to cover the cargo to its final
destination, to include overland transportation (warehouse to warehouse
coverage).113 The policy included a temperature control provision
whereby Commercial Union agreed to cover “[a]ll Risks of physical loss
109. Great S. Wood Preserving, Inc. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 292 F. App’x 8, 10
n.3 (11th Cir. 2008).
110. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sea Harvest Seafood Co., 251 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir.
2001).
111. Id. at 1296.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1298.

18

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:1

or damage from any external cause, but excluding: A. Deterioration,
decay or spoilage unless the Assured can demonstrate that such damage
was directly caused by derangement or breakdown of the refrigeration
machinery or directly caused by the vessel stranding, sinking, burning or
in collision.”114
The controversy arose when Sea Harvest undertook shipping 36,000
pounds of frozen shrimp from Bangkok, Thailand to Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania.115 The shipment of shrimp was to arrive in California and
be transported by rail, first to Chicago, Illinois, and eventually on to
Philadelphia.116 However, somewhere in transit, someone forgot to attach
a gen-set (a device that provides power to a reefer unit) to the cargo
container containing the shrimp.117 As a result of the mishap, the entire
shipment of shrimp was spoiled.118 Sea Harvest subsequently made a
claim to its insurer, Commercial Union, who then denied the claim.119
The following day, Commercial Union commenced an action for
declaratory judgment, contending that it was not responsible for the
payment for Sea Harvest’s claim under the maritime insurance policy.120
Following filing for declaratory judgment, Commercial Union then
moved for summary judgment arguing that under admiralty law, the
failure to plug in a gen-set did not constitute an external “derangement or
breakdown of refrigeration machinery.”121 The district court agreed and
granted Commercial Union’s motion for summary judgment.122 Sea
Harvest timely appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its
application of admiralty law to the interpretation of the contract.123 In
determining whether admiralty law applied, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals did a “maritime contract” analysis to determine whether the
“mixed contract” (as this policy covered cargo over the ocean transport
as well as during land transport) was one that could be qualified as a
maritime contract, the interpretation of which was to be done pursuant to
admiralty law.124 Importantly, regardless of whether the claim is made in
state court or in federal court sitting in either diversity or admiralty,
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 1296.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1297.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1298.
Id.
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where the claim is a maritime controversy, the court will apply federal
admiralty law.125
In determining the applicable choice of law, the court used a
jurisdictional analysis, due to the above mentioned choice of law rules in
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen.126 In doing so, the court noted that while
the policy was one that covered cargo, in this instance, the coverage of
the cargo “involved significant maritime travel,”127 as “the shipment
from Bangkok to Los Angeles was clearly the predominant part of the
transaction.”128 Thus, the court held that the contract was a maritime
contract,129 and coupled with the principles set out in Jensen,130 general
maritime law applied, and the maritime interpretation of the terms of the
contract controlled.131 Thus the Tenth Circuit has taken a geographic
distance-type approach in determining whether the mixed contract was
substantially maritime, such that the contact’s connection with maritime
commerce was not “too speculative and attenuated to support admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction.”132
Although this case was decided prior to Kirby, given the similarity of
this type of controversy to that of a multi-modal transportation contract
dispute, it is likely that the jurisdictional test set out in Kirby is as easily
applied to warehouse to warehouse marine cargo insurance contract
cases as it is to other multi-modal transportation contractual disputes.
Furthermore, based on the factual similarities between those in Kirby and
those predominating disputes over this type of mixed contracts and
warehouse to warehouse marine cargo insurance contracts, it makes
sense that the jurisdictional test set out in Kirby works. This is the case
because multi-modal transportation contracts and warehouse to
warehouse open cargo insurance policies inherently contain an objective
geographic measure by which to determine the substantiality of the
maritime portions of the contract, thus making the Kirby test for
admiralty jurisdiction an appropriate test. However, as will be discussed
in further detail below, a different test or approach should be applied to
situations that lack the spatial component of the aforementioned

125. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 217 (1917).
126. Id.
127. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sea Harvest Seafood Co., 251 F.3d 1294, 1302
(10th Cir. 2001).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 207.
131. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 251 F.3d at 1298.
132. Id. at 1301-02.
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contracts.133 As such, certain mixed contracts, such as umbrella
insurance contracts or master service agreements that lack an objective,
spatial, or geographic element, make the Kirby test somewhat
inappropriate. As a result, it would be more advantageous for the
Supreme Court to limit the application of Kirby to multi-modal
transportation contracts and warehouse to warehouse marine cargo
insurance contracts.
b. Master Service Agreements
Given the nature of the offshore oil industry, many contracts are
what can be characterized as “master service contracts” or “blanket
contracts.” Generally, these contracts may involve the provision of
materials and supplies to an offshore fixed platform (which is considered
an extension of land for the purpose of admiralty jurisdiction)134 by way
of a vessel, and may also include a service agreement whereby the
contracting party agrees to do maintenance work on the fixed platform.
As a result, these contracts necessarily include maritime and nonmaritime components. With regard to this particular type of mixed
contract, courts’ exercise of admiralty jurisdiction has serious
implications regarding enforceability of these contracts or specific
provisions therein.
In determining whether a master service contract or blanket contract
is a maritime contract subject to a court’s admiralty jurisdiction, the Fifth
Circuit has taken the lead in fashioning a jurisdictional test for
determining when the maritime elements of a master service agreement
are “substantial” so as to comport with Kirby. Prior to the Fifth Circuit’s
2009 decision in Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC,135 the
test for when a master service agreement was “salty” enough was that
enunciated in Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp.136
Davis & Sons involved a contract whereby Davis & Sons, Inc. would
provide barges in order to transport its own employees to do maintenance
work on defendant’s offshore drilling rig, including: painting living
quarters, cranes and other equipment; inspecting and repairing engines
and cranes; and operating and navigating the barge.137 Importantly, the
contract also included an indemnity clause, whereby Davis & Sons
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See infra Section III(C)(2)(c).
Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 360 (5th Cir. 1969).
589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009).
Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 919 F.2d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 314.
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would be forced to indemnify Gulf Oil in the event a Davis employee
was injured on a Gulf Oil rig and sued Gulf Oil.138 In Davis & Sons the
court fashioned a now-antiquated test for determining whether a mixed
master service agreement was maritime in nature and could be decided
under the exercise of the court’s admiralty jurisdiction.139 In doing so, the
court created a multi-factored approach to determine whether the
contract was substantially a maritime contract, holding:
[the] [d]etermination of the nature of a contract depends in part
on historical treatment in the jurisprudence and in part on a factspecific inquiry. We consider six factors in characterizing the
contract: 1) what does the specific work order in effect at the
time of injury provide? 2) what work did the crew assigned
under the work order actually do? 3) was the crew assigned to
work aboard a vessel in navigable waters? 4) to what extent did
the work being done relate to the mission of that vessel? 5) what
was the principal work of the injured worker? and 6) what work
was the injured worker actually doing at the time of injury?140
Based on those factors, the court found that the contract was a maritime
contract despite the non-maritime elements and was thus subject to the
court’s admiralty jurisdiction.141 This designation was of significant
importance, and it illustrates the legal implications that result from
litigating a dispute under the Fifth Circuit’s admiralty jurisdiction. Here,
as a result of the court’s finding that the contract was a maritime
contract, subject to the court’s admiralty jurisdiction, federal maritime
law applied, and, as a result, the indemnity provision was valid and
enforceable.142 Had the contract not been a maritime contract, Louisiana
law would have applied and the indemnity clause would have been
unenforceable.
Since the Davis & Sons decision, the Fifth Circuit has attempted to
simplify their factor-based test’s focus on the locale of the injury that
gave rise to the contractual dispute, and in doing so, keeping with Kirby
by focusing on the primary objective of the contract to determine the
substantiality of the maritime elements.143 Similar to Davis & Sons,
Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC 144 addressed whether a
138.
139.
140.
141.
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contract was a maritime contract that should be heard pursuant to the
court’s admiralty jurisdiction and decided according to federal maritime
law, and subsequently whether the indemnity provision should be upheld
as valid.145 To find that the contracts were not maritime contracts would
require the court to decide the controversy pursuant to federal question
jurisdiction based on the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,146 which
would result in applying the adjacent state’s law, here Louisiana, and
find the indemnity provisions invalid.147
In Grand Isle Shipyard,148 the Fifth Circuit modified the Davis &
Sons test to a “focus-of-the-contract test,”149 which looks to where the
contract contemplates that most of the work will be performed, rather
than where a majority of the work was actually performed.150 The court
found where most of the work called for by the contract is on stationary
platforms located on the Outer Continental Shelf, the contract is
considered as a non-maritime contract to be decided pursuant to the
adjacent state’s law,151 because courts treat stationary platforms as
extensions of land.152 However, if a majority of the work contemplated in
the contract is aboard vessels on navigable water, then the contract is a
maritime contract and subject to the court’s admiralty jurisdiction
regardless of non-maritime elements included in the contract.153
Based on this new test, the Fifth Circuit found that “because the
relevant contract contemplated that a majority of the contractor’s work
would be performed on stationary platforms on the [Outer Continental
Shelf], this should be deemed the relevant ‘situs’ for the instant
indemnity dispute and because none of the other factors lead us to apply
any other law, we must apply Louisiana law.”154 Thus, the court found
that the indemnity provisions in each of the contracts were invalid.155
As a result, when it comes to master service agreements, the Fifth
Circuit has taken the lead in Grand Isle Shipyard on formulating
jurisdictional tests, creating a “focus-of-the-contract test.”156 This “focus145.
146.
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of-the-contract test” holistically looks at the entirety of a contract to
determine where the majority of the work is contemplated, subsequently
determining whether the contract is a maritime contract to justify the
exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction. Moreover, given the difficulty
presented in applying the Kirby test to determine whether the court has
admiralty jurisdiction over a mixed contract such as a master service
agreement—a contract that lacks the spatial or geographic elements
inherent in multi-modal transportation contracts and warehouse to
warehouse marine cargo insurance policies—it appears that the Fifth
Circuit approach is the best test for determining admiralty jurisdiction.
This is the case as the Grand Isle Shipyard test comports with the Kirby
test’s required focus on the substantiality of the maritime elements of the
contract.157 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit takes a holistic approach to the
mixed contract to determine the “saltiness”158 of the contract, without the
benefit of a spatial or geographically measurable element.
This line of cases illustrates the difficulty presented in applying the
factually specific test handed down in Kirby to factually dissimilar
situations. On the other hand, Grand Isle Shipyard is exemplary of the
Fifth Circuit’s success in dealing with mixed contract and the Kirby test.
In addition to the jurisdictional inquiry, Grand Isle Shipyard also
illustrates the very significant legal implications and consequences that
accompany the court’s decision in hearing a dispute pursuant to its
admiralty jurisdiction. As has been discussed, Kirby is applicable in
multi-modal transportation contracts, warehouse to warehouse marine
cargo insurance policies, and to some extent, master service
agreements;159 however the applicability ends there. When it comes to
umbrella marine insurance policies, Kirby is lacking because courts have
not determined the best way to determine the primary objective of the
contract. Furthermore, when it comes to umbrella insurance policies,
looking at the contract alone leads to potentially anomalous results, such
as litigating shore-side coverage for shore-side injuries before a court
sitting in admiralty. Thus, where Kirby may be applied in the abovediscussed types of mixed contracts, the courts should apply a different
and more appropriate test to determine admiralty jurisdiction for marine
umbrella insurance policies.

157. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 23-25 (2004).
158. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742 (1961).
159. Kirby, 543 U.S. at 27.
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c. Marine Insurance
The Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear that
marine insurance policies are contracts squarely within the purview of
the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction.160 However, there is no concrete
precedent as to how the Court is to treat mixed insurance contracts—
those that cover both shore-side and sea-side risks under the umbrella of
a single policy—when determining whether the contract is a maritime
contract within the parameters of the Courts’ admiralty jurisdiction. This
issue was less difficult under the pre-Kirby test that held where the nonmaritime part of the contract was (1) merely incidental or (2) could be
separated from the maritime portion of the contract, the Court would
exercise admiralty jurisdiction.161 Where, however, the maritime and
non-maritime claims were bound together and could not be separated, the
Court would refuse to exercise admiralty jurisdiction in order to hear the
dispute, even as to disputes arising out of the maritime elements of the
contract.162 The post-Kirby jurisdictional inquiry is significantly more
arduous.
Unlike the case of other multi-modal transportation contracts and, to
a lesser extent, master service agreements, the various Circuit Courts
have had a universally difficult and varying approach to applying the
jurisdictional test as set out in Kirby to bumbershoot and umbrella
insurance policies.163 Due to the difficulty the courts have encountered in
implementing Kirby in these mixed coverage insurance policies, the
several Circuit Courts have come out with various methods of
application.164 The varying methods of application present the shipping
industry and the insurance industry with a lack of uniformity or
predictability. This lack of uniformity or predictability is counterintuitive
to the goal of uniformity to which courts have aspired, and for this
reason, the courts should limit the application of Kirby to those types of
contracts discussed above. With regard to umbrella insurance policies,
courts should adhere to a test similar to that asserted in Folksamerica

160. New Eng. Mut. Marine Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. 1 (1870).
161. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, § 3-10 n.53; see also Flota Maritima Browning de
Cuba, Sociadad Anonima v. Snobl, 363 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1966).
162. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, § 3-10 n.56.
163. Compare St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins., Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 418 F. App’x 305,
308 (2011), with Sentry Select Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 481 F.3d 1208, 1219
(2007).
164. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins., Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 418 F. App’x 305, 308
(2011); Sentry Select Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 481 F.3d 1208, 1219 (2007).
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Reinsurance Co. v. Clean Water of New York, Inc.165 to provide
practitioners with a more predictable landscape within which to
negotiate, draft umbrella insurance policies, and litigate disputes arising
therefrom.
Below is an overview of the different methods with which the Circuit
Courts have dealt with Kirby in determining whether the umbrella policy
in question is a maritime contract subject to admiralty jurisdiction. A
review of these several tests makes it obvious that the Second Circuit’s is
the best approach due to its threshold inquiry into the nature of the
dispute, ensuring that anomalous disputes are not unnaturally litigated in
a court sitting in admiralty. Moreover, the court’s follow up examination
into the scope of the coverage most closely aligns with the conceptual
approach historically emphasized in American jurisprudence while also
adhering to the jurisdictional test as set forth in Kirby.166
i. The Second Circuit: Folksamerica Reinsurance Co. v. Clean
Water of New York, Inc.
At issue in Folksamerica was a comprehensive general liability
policy that contained a ship-repairer’s legal liability policy that
effectively provided umbrella coverage for Clean Water’s operations. In
this case, an employee who worked for a company with whom Clean
Water had subcontracted was injured while cleaning the oil tanks of a
barge.167 The employee brought a negligence claim in state court against
Clean Water.168 Following the initiation of the suit, Clean Water notified
its insurer of the action, and the insurer’s successor in interest,
Folksamerica, filed suit in the Eastern District of New York seeking a
declaration that it had no duty to indemnify or defend Clean Water.169
Clean Water moved for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
arguing that the CGL section of the Policy was a standard “all risk
policy” and contended that the maritime risks covered by the Policy were
“merely incidental” at best.170 The District Court agreed that the
maritime portions of the contract were merely incidental to the nonmaritime elements and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, holding that the policy was neither wholly nor primarily
165. 413 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 2005).
166. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 23-25 (2004).
167. Folksamerica Reinsurance Co. v. Clean Water of N.Y., Inc., 413 F.3d 307, 310
(2d Cir. 2005).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 311.
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maritime in nature, and that the court only had admiralty jurisdiction
where “the non-maritime elements were merely incidental in an
otherwise maritime contract,”171 and the CGL section was not incidental.
Following the District Court’s dismissal, Folksamerica appealed.172
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the
District Court had failed to apply Kirby. However, in doing its own
jurisdictional analysis by applying Kirby, the court went beyond Kirby’s
“primary objective” inquiry and held that before it could inquire into the
subject matter of the contract, it must first make a “threshold inquiry”
into the subject matter of the dispute.”173 The Court held that “[b]efore
attempting to categorize contractual rights as maritime or non-maritime,
a federal court must first consider whether an issue related to maritime
interests has been raised.”174 In so holding, rather than focusing directly
on the nature and subject matter of the contract itself to determine if the
contract was substantially a maritime contract, the court chose as a
threshold inquiry to focus on the nature of the dispute and to only then
look at the subject matter of the contract by analyzing the terms of
coverage in the policy to determine if the policy’s “primary objective”
was maritime in nature. In its threshold inquiry regarding the subject
matter of the dispute, the court held that the parties’ dispute concerned
“an insurance claim based on a ship-maintenance-related injury sustained
by a ship oil-tank cleaner aboard an ocean-going vessel in navigable
waters. The business of ship maintenance has long been recognized as
maritime, and the insurance claim arising out of a related onboard injury
has more than a ‘speculative and attenuated’ connection with maritime
commerce.”175After satisfying its threshold inquiry, the court went on to
examine the subject matter of the contract itself by “examining the scope
of policy coverage to determine whether primary objective is to
accomplish the transportation of goods by sea,” as required by Kirby. 176
In order to examine the subject matter of the contract, the court
focused on the actual coverage and risks assumed by the insurer in the
171. Id. (citing Folksamerica Reinsurance Co. v. Clean Water of New York, Inc., 281
F. Supp. 2d 530, 533 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 312 (citing In re Balfour MacLaine Int’l Ltd., 85 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir.
1996)).
174. Id. (citing Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Balfour Maclaine Int’l Ltd., 968 F.2d 196, 199 (2d
Cir. 1992)); see Balfour, 85 F.3d at 74-75; cf. Thypin Steel Co. v. Asoma Corp., 215 F.3d
273, 278-79 (2d Cir. 2000); Sirius Ins. Co. (UK) Ltd. v. Collins, 16 F.3d 34, 37 (2d Cir.
1994).
175. Folksamerica Reinsurance Co., 413 F.3d at 313.
176. Id. at 314.
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policy. In looking at risks covered, the Court noted that the “operations
hazards” and “products hazards” were maritime in nature because they
could encompass personal injury or property damage arising out of
defective or faulty repair of a vessel or other hazards that could be
associated with maritime activity.177 Additionally, the court noted that
the CGL policy also covered pollution.178 Given the above coverages,
taken with ship-repairers’ legal liability coverage that included a
“travelling workmen clause” extending coverage to work “on board the
Vessel and/or Drilling Rig at sea or in any port for the purpose of
effecting repairs and/or other work entrusted to the Assured . . . .179 the
court found that the policy was a maritime contract and, therefore,
exercised admiralty jurisdiction over the dispute.180 As a result of the
court’s holding that the umbrella policy was a maritime contract, it
vacated the District Court’s dismissal.181
As can be seen, in reconciling the Supreme Court’s holding in Kirby
with umbrella insurance policies, the Second Circuit used a threshold
inquiry regarding the subject matter of the dispute prior to even
examining the subject matter of the contract in order to determine
whether the maritime elements of the contract were “substantial.” Only
after satisfying itself that the dispute was a maritime dispute did the court
turn its attention to the terms of the contract by focusing on the scope of
the coverage, to determine if the mixed contract’s maritime elements
were substantial enough to justify the court’s exercise of admiralty
jurisdiction. This is clearly a better approach to a jurisdictional test,
especially when it comes to umbrella insurance policies. This approach
ensures that anomalous disputes are not litigated before a court sitting in
admiralty, and the subsequent inquiry into the policy coverages of the
contract ensures that the jurisdictional requirements of Kirby are
satisfied.
Due to the fact that the jurisdictional test handed down in Kirby only
applies neatly to situations that have an objective geographic measure by
which to determine the substantiality of the maritime portions of the
contract, such as multi-modal transportation contracts and warehouse to
warehouse open cargo policies, a different test or approach should be
applied to situations that lack the spatial component of the
aforementioned contracts. Given this fact, the Second Circuit approach
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 320.
Id. at 321.
Id. at 323.
Id.
Id. at 324.
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discussed above, or some derivative version of this approach, (like that
which the Fifth Circuit has employed), is the most appropriate approach
for determining whether a court has admiralty jurisdiction in disputes
arising out of umbrella coverage insurance policies. Under this approach,
a court first inquires whether there are maritime issues, and then it
determines whether it has admiralty jurisdiction by analyzing the nature
of the contract by way of the broad coverages expressed in the policy.
ii. The Sixth Circuit: New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Home
Savings & Loan Co. of Youngstown, Ohio182
Unlike the Second Circuit’s approach of engaging in an initial
inquiry as to the subject matter of the dispute, followed by an
examination of the policy coverage to determine if the policy was
primarily a maritime contract, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals instead
chose to dispense with the threshold inquiry regarding the “saltiness”183
of the dispute and instead skip straight to focusing on the “interests
insured” to determine if the policy was enough of a maritime contract to
justify admiralty jurisdiction.184 While this approach determines whether
a particular umbrella insurance policy is “salty”185 enough to justify
admiralty jurisdiction better than a pure Kirby approach, it is not as
effective as the Second Circuit’s approach previously discussed. This is
because the Sixth Circuit approach lacks the practicality and
predictability of the Second Circuit’s approach. As such, while the Sixth
Circuit approach is better than a purist application of Kirby, the Second
Circuit’s initial inquiry into the nature of the dispute more effectively
keeps maritime matters within the courts admiralty jurisdiction and keeps
shore-side matters on the land-side of the court’s jurisdiction.
In New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Home Savings & Loan Co. of
Youngstown, Ohio, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals grappled with how
best to determine the maritime nature of a “Yacht Dealer/Marina
Operator’s” general liability insurance policy in order to determine
whether it could hear the case pursuant to its admiralty jurisdiction.186
The policy was purchased by National Marine, Inc. (“National Marine”)
from New Hampshire Insurance Co. (“NHIC”).187 The policy covered
182. N.H. Ins. Co. v. Home Sav. & Loan Co. of Youngstown, Ohio, 581 F.3d 420 (6th
Cir. 2009).
183. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742 (1961).
184. N.H. Ins. Co., 581 F.3d at 427.
185. Kossick, 365 U.S. at 742.
186. N.H. Ins. Co., 581 F.3d at 423, 427.
187. Id. at 422.
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National Marine for both “Yacht Dealer Operations” and “Marina
Operations” covering loss or damage to its inventory, loss or damage to
third-party property while in its custody, personal injury or property
damage occurring on its boats or at its marina, and loss or damage to its
tools and equipment, but expressly excluding coverage for “owned
watercraft.”188 The policy also included $300,000 in “Truth in Lending
Errors and Omissions Liability Coverage” to insure against any damage
due to “the unintentional violation of any Federal or State Consumer
Credit Act, or similar statute, law or ordinance.”189 Several of National
Marine’s customers and two banks sued, alleging that National Marine
made fraudulent misrepresentations and failed to deliver certain boats
with clean title.190 In response, National Marine filed a claim with NHIC
under the “Truth in Lending” provision of the policy, requesting legal
defense and indemnification from the charges.191 NHIC initially paid the
claim but reserved its right to contest. It filed suit designating the case as
one falling under the court’s admiralty jurisdiction and asked the district
court to rescind the policy (on misrepresentation grounds) or declare that
it did not cover these charges.192 The defendants then made a motion to
dismiss pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, arguing that, because
prior state court proceedings would resolve the same factual and legal
disputes between the same parties, the federal court could abstain from
the exercise of jurisdiction.193 After a three-year stay in litigation due to
an ongoing bankruptcy proceeding, the district court dismissed the case
without prejudice.194 As a basis for its dismissal the court held that,
because Declaratory Judgment Act did not provide for its own federal
subject matter jurisdiction, “it would assume subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) because the insurance policy at issue
was a ‘marine insurance policy,’” and dismiss the claim without
prejudice because the facts and law of the case supported discretionary
abstention.195
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined it would
examine the basis for admiralty jurisdiction sua sponte before it could
adequately review the legal basis for the lower court’s dismissal.196 The
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
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Court immediately recognized that if the dispute were to be heard under
its admiralty jurisdiction, it would have to be determined to be a
maritime contract.197 Furthermore, given that the policy was an umbrella
policy that covered seemingly maritime risks and apparently nonmaritime risks, it determined it would have to do a mixed contracts
inquiry to determine whether the case could be heard under its admiralty
jurisdiction pursuant to the rule handed down in Kirby.198 In doing so,
rather than following the Second Circuit’s approach and engaging in an
initial inquiry as to the subject matter of the dispute, followed by an
examination of the policy coverage to determine if the policy is primarily
a maritime contract, the court chose to disregard the initial inquiry into
the subject matter of the dispute. Rather than focus on the policy
coverage, it focused instead on the “interests insured” to determine if the
policy was enough of a maritime contract to justify admiralty
jurisdiction.199 In focusing its inquiry on the interests insured to
determine if the contract was one in which the primary objective was
maritime commerce, the court cited that, with regard to the yacht-dealer
provisions of the policy, the interests insured only included boats as
objects of commerce, treated as “stock for sale,” not as agents of
maritime commerce and, as a result, did “not relate to maritime
commerce.200 The Court went on to hold that with regard to the Marina
Operator’s coverage, the policy really only covered fixed structures and
the operation of the marina rather than vessels in it.201 Based on the
above analysis, the court held that the contract was not one for which the
primary objective was maritime commerce and consequently dismissed
the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.202
While this is a correct outcome, the process and analysis were
unnecessary and convoluted. In this case, rather than go through a drawn
out analysis of “interests insured,” the Court could have very quickly
dispensed with the issue of whether it could exercise its admiralty
jurisdiction in the matter by utilizing the threshold inquiry into the
“nature of the dispute” approach. If this were done, the Court could have
skipped any other legal determination. This case was about a truth in
lending insurance claim and had very little to do with admiralty
jurisdiction or law, and it could have been quickly dispensed with as
such. Whereas this case provides an excellent example of a different
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 424-25, 427.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 431. Owned vessels were expressly excluded from coverage. Id. at 422.
Id.
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approach to applying the Kirby jurisdictional test to an umbrella
insurance policy, it makes for a better argument in favor of the
application of the Second Circuit approach as a way of simplifying
jurisdictional determinations in situations involving mixed contracts, as
was illustrated in the above discussion. Moreover, determining the “salty
flavor”203 of an insurance policy by focusing on the “interests insured” is
not substantially different from the Second Circuit’s focus on policy
coverage and should not yield different results, but it does require drawn
out and convoluted analyses which degrade uniformity and
predictability. As such, the utilization of a Second Circuit threshold
inquiry into the nature of the dispute would not only relieve courts of the
necessity of doing convoluted and abstract jurisdictional analyses where
the dispute itself has no ties to the water, but it would also provide a
more common sense application of admiralty jurisdiction.
iii. The Fifth Circuit: St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v.
Board of Commissioners of Port of New Orleans204
In determining whether a court may exercise admiralty jurisdiction in
order to hear a dispute arising out of an umbrella insurance policy
providing both shore-side and sea-side coverage, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals utilizes a hybrid of the Second Circuit and the Sixth Circuit
Courts of Appeals approaches. In doing so, like the Second Circuit, the
Fifth Circuit first examines the terms of coverage to determine if the
primary objective of the contract was maritime commerce; but then, like
the Sixth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit determines the focus of the contract by
examining the “interests insured.”205 While this approach certainly does
focus on the contract itself and those interests involved in the contract,
almost to a fault, the Fifth Circuit’s failure to engage in a Second Circuit
threshold inquiry into the nature of the dispute removes any common
sense from a supposed jurisdictional test. As the below discussion
illustrates, failure to engage in a threshold dispute inquiry results in odd
jurisdictional consequences, such as litigation over shore-side insurance
coverage for damages for a shore-side injury.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Board of Commissioners of
Port of New Orleans involved a “bumbershoot” policy, which is

203. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742 (1961).
204. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Port of New Orleans, 646 F.
Supp. 2d 813 (E.D. La. 2009) aff’d 418 F. App’x 305 (5th Cir. 2011).
205. Id. at 819.
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essentially an umbrella policy.206 Here the policy was issued by St. Paul
Fire and Marine Insurance Co. (“St. Paul”) to the Board of
Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans (“the Port”) and provided
excess coverage for liabilities that exceeded the specific underlying
policies, and filled the liability gaps where the underlying policies failed
to cover other liabilities.207 The underlying policies included coverage
for: 1) comprehensive general liability, 2) auto liability, 3) worker’s
compensation, 4) employer’s liability, 5) maritime employer’s liability,
6) Jones Act coverage, 7) protection and indemnity (P&I) for crew and
employees, as well as, collision and towers, 8) vessel pollution, and 9)
public official’s liability.208 In addition to the above coverages, the policy
also included a notice of occurrence provision, whereby the Port was to
give notice to St. Paul as “‘soon as practicable’ whenever the Port ‘may
reasonably conclude that an occurrence covered [under the policy]
involve[d] an event likely to involve [the] Policy’” (judgment/settlement
in excess of USD 1,000,000.00).209 In addition to the notice provision,
the policy also contained a New York choice of law provision.210
The coverage dispute arose when a port worker was injured when the
large lift truck (commonly known as a “top loader”) that he was
operating fell into a pothole in an open area of the France Road Terminal
(known as the “marshaling yard”) in July of 2001.211 In 2002, the worker
filed suit against the Port.212 The Louisiana court held that, while the area
in which the worker was operating the vehicle was leased to his
employer, P&O Ports of Louisiana, it was owned by the Port. As a result
of the Port’s ownership of the area and the Louisiana statute, La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 9:3221 (2005), that maintains the owner’s liability for
injuries that occur due to a known defect, the court held the Port liable
for the worker’s injuries. As a result, the trial court entered a judgment
for $2.6 million in favor of the injured worker, as well as $50,000 for a
loss of consortium claim by the worker’s wife, on February 28, 2007,
which was then amended on March 23, 2007.213 The Louisiana Court of
Appeals then affirmed this judgment on May 14, 2008.214 However, the
206. Id. at 818.
207. Id. at 816.
208. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Port of New Orleans, 2009
WL 1718225, at *4 (E.D. La. May 29, 2009).
209. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d at 816.
210. Id. at 817.
211. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 2009 WL 1718225, at *2.
212. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d at 816.
213. Id. at 816.
214. Id.
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Port had failed to give St. Paul the required notice of occurrence until
March 28, 2007, one month after the initial judgment, and five days
following the amended judgment.215 Based on the Port’s failure to give
the required notice until after the amended judgment, St. Paul brought
suit under the Fifth Circuit’s admiralty jurisdiction seeking a declaration
“that that the Port was not entitled to coverage based on a policy
provision requiring that the insured send notice ‘as soon as practicable’
whenever it ‘may reasonably conclude that an occurrence covered [under
the policy] involves an event likely to involve [the] Policy.’”216
With regard to admiralty jurisdiction, the Port argued that the
bumbershoot policy was not a maritime contract because it was a mixed
contract and covered several shore-side risks and was meant only as an
excess and gap-filling policy. In analyzing whether its admiralty subject
matter jurisdictional requirements were met, the Court utilized a Second
Circuit/Sixth Circuit hybrid approach. In the first prong of the Fifth
Circuit’s jurisdictional test, the court utilized the second prong of the
Second Circuit’s test and did a “policy coverage analysis.” In doing so,
the Court held that, “[t]he terms of the bumbershoot policy here provided
excess coverage to other maritime insurance contracts and specifically
included traditional marine coverages. The fact that the coverage also
included some land-based operations of the Port [was] not dispositive
because the functioning and purpose of the Port show that the conceptual
focus of the policy is maritime commerce.”217 Having satisfied itself that
the coverage provided by the policy was primarily maritime, the Court
then engaged in a Sixth Circuit “interests insured” analysis. In doing so,
the Court recognized that the interests insured encompassed the port and
its operation as such. The Court stated that “the Port is specifically
charged with the statutory duty to ‘regulate the commerce and traffic of
the port and harbor of New Orleans.’”218 The Court went on to recite that
“[t]he Port’s operations, although partially land-based, are thus
inextricably related to maritime commerce.”219 The Court concluded by
stating, “[g]iven the type of policy, the marine coverages and inclusion
of specific vessels, and the statutory duty of the Port to regulate the
commerce at the harbor and port of New Orleans . . . the nature and
character of the contract focused on maritime commerce,”220 and the
exercise of admiralty jurisdiction was appropriate as a result.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
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This case is a good example of the Fifth Circuit’s attempt to
hybridize existing approaches in order to both: one, mold a jurisdictional
test that determines the “saltiness”221 of a marine insurance umbrella
policy and; two, to comply with the test handed down in Kirby. More
importantly, this case illustrates the significance of the legal implications
associated with litigating a contractual dispute before a court sitting in
admiralty. In this case, the Port contested admiralty jurisdiction in order
to avoid admiralty choice of law rules. This is the case as “under
admiralty law, where the parties have included a choice of law clause,
[the named] state’s law will govern unless the state has no substantial
relationship to the parties or the transaction or the state’s law conflicts
with the fundamental purposes of maritime law.”222 In the event the court
did not have admiralty jurisdiction and was only sitting in diversity, the
law of the state with the most significant contacts would have applied. In
this case, Louisiana had the most significant contacts and would have
applied, and, because Louisiana law prohibited the inclusion of choiceof-law clauses that apply non-Louisiana law to an insurance policy
issued or delivered in the state, the New York choice of law clause would
have been invalid. In short, had the court not exercised admiralty
jurisdiction, the notice of occurrence provision would have been
interpreted according to Louisiana law, which requires a showing of
prejudice, rather than New York law, which does not require a showing
of prejudice, to hold a policy void for late notice of occurrence. This
difference would have changed the entire outcome of the case. Finally, in
addition to illustrating the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdictional approach to
mixed contracts and further illustrating the implications of such a
designation, this case is an excellent display of the virtue of the Second
Circuit’s threshold inquiry into the subject matter of the dispute. Here a
court sitting in admiralty decided a case involving insurance coverage for
a land-based injury. This is anomalous and inappropriate. Had the Court
utilized the Second Circuit approach, this anomalous result would not
have been the case. So, while this does not necessarily present any new
doctrine, this is a didactic case insofar as it illustrates the consequences
of litigating a coverage dispute over an umbrella policy before a court
sitting in admiralty.
iv. The Ninth Circuit: Sentry Select Insurance Co. v. Royal
221. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742 (1961).
222. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Port of New Orleans, 646 F.
Supp. 2d 813, 819 (E.D. La. 2009) (quoting Stoot v. Fluor Drilling Servs., Inc., 851 F.2d
1514, 1517 (5th Cir. 1988)).
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Insurance Co. of America
Unlike the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, or the Fifth Circuit, the
Ninth Circuit utilizes a holistic “all encompassing”-type approach; rather
than focusing on the policy coverage or the interests insured, the Court
looks at the entire policy to determine if the primary or “principal
objective of [the] contract [was] maritime commerce.”223 This approach
is surprisingly similar to the Fifth Circuit’s approach to determining the
“saltiness”224 of a master service agreement as embodied in Grand Isle
Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC. However, when applied to marine
insurance umbrella policies, this approach is untenable and essentially
makes the court’s admiralty jurisdiction discretionary in that it allows the
court to look at the entire contract (without enunciating factors or
specific waypoints) and decide whether it feels “salty” enough to
exercise admiralty jurisdiction.
The dispute in Sentry Select Insurance Co. v. Royal Insurance Co. of
America, came about as a result of a coverage dispute regarding an
excess/umbrella policy and a shore-side injury.225 The insurance
coverage dispute involved an accident, which happened on land during
the transfer of a prefabricated house to a remote construction site.226
Kelly-Ryan, a Seattle, Washington based construction company, was in
the business of shipping prefabricated houses from Washington to
Alaska, where Kelly-Ryan then installed the houses in Native Alaskan
villages pursuant to a contract with the federal government.227 KellyRyan transported the prefabricated houses from Washington to Alaska by
barge, and upon arrival to Alaska, Kelly-Ryan then transferred the
houses from the barges to “house movers,” which were used to transport
the houses to their final construction site, where Kelly-Ryan would
install the houses.228 On one shipment, “a maritime employee of KellyRyan working on the tugboat . . . was electrocuted while he was helping
a Kelly-Ryan shore-based crew deliver a prefabricated house to a
building site located approximately one and a half miles from the
shore.”229

223. Sentry Select Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 481 F.3d 1208, 1218 (9th Cir.
2007) (citations omitted).
224. Kossick, 365 U.S. at 742.
225. Sentry Select Ins. Co., 481 F.3d at 1219.
226. Id. at 1212.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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At the time of the accident, Kelly-Ryan had insurance coverage for
its crewmembers and other vessel operations by way of a protection and
indemnity (P&I) policy subscribed to by Sentry Select and Lloyd’s.230 In
addition to the P&I coverage, Kelly-Ryan also had a shore-side
employee-related injury liability coverage policy issued by Alaska
National.231 The Alaska National Policy was split into two parts. Part
One included coverage for “Washington and Alaska State workers’
compensation, unemployment, and disability claims, as well as claims
under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. . . . Part
Two of the Alaska National policy, the employers’ liability portion,
provide[d] coverage for bodily injuries arising out of and in the course of
employment, but exclude[d] ‘any obligation imposed by workers
compensation . . . law.’”232 In addition to the above coverages, KellyRyan had also obtained excess/umbrella coverage from Royal Insurance
Company of America (“Royal”) by way of Royal’s “Big Shield”
policy.233 The “Big Shield policy provided excess coverage over Part
Two of the Alaska National policy, Kelly-Ryan’s automobile insurance,
and Kelly-Ryan’s Commercial General Liability (‘CGL’) policy with
Alaska National.”234 However, the Big Shield policy did not provide
excess coverage for claims covered “under Part One of the Alaska
National policy or the P&I policies,” nor did the policy cover workers’
compensation due to an exclusion “excepting from coverage ‘[a]ny
obligation of the insured under a workers compensation . . . law.’”235 In
addition to the “Big Shield” policy, Kelly-Ryan also
obtained from Royal an Marine Employer’s Liability (MEL)
endorsement to Part Two of the Alaska National policy
(employers’ liability) and the Royal Big Shield policy. The MEL
endorsement extended coverage for bodily injuries suffered by a
‘master or member of the crew of any vessel’ performing work
‘necessary or incidental’ to the following tasks: ‘Painting and/or
scraping of decks of tugs or barges, and loading and unloading as
applicable in Washington and Alaska.’236
The MEL endorsement provided coverage for losses in excess of one
million dollars.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
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Following the accident and a failed attempt to file for workers
compensation, the maritime employee filed suit under the Jones Act, and
Kelly-Ryan and its P&I insurers ended up settling the maritime
employee’s claim for $5,276,630.47.237Kelly-Ryan and its P&I
underwriters then brought action against Alaska National and later
Royal, pursuant to the court’s admiralty jurisdiction, seeking a
declaration of coverage. Royal eventually moved for summary judgment
arguing that, since the policy in controversy was a marine insurance
contract and the suit was brought under the court’s admiralty jurisdiction,
general maritime law applied, and based on the doctrine of “uberrimea
fidei,”238 “the policy was void ab inito because Kelly-Ryan had failed to
disclose that employees would be handling high-voltage power lines.”239
The District Court granted Royal’s motion for summary judgment. On
appeal, Kelly-Ryan challenged the court’s admiralty jurisdiction and the
applicability of uberrimea fidei.240
Prior to analyzing whether the contractual dispute satisfied the
jurisdictional requirements for admiralty jurisdiction, the Court made it
clear that either party (including the plaintiff) may attack subject matter
jurisdiction at any point in the litigation as subject matter jurisdiction
may not be waived nor may a party be estopped from raising it as an
issue.241 Having dispensed with the issue of whether Kelly-Ryan had
waived subject matter jurisdiction or was estopped from raising it as an
issue, the Court went onto do a mixed contract admiralty jurisdiction
analysis. In regards to the ability of the Court to exercise admiralty
jurisdiction over the contractual dispute itself, the Court noted that the
umbrella policy was a mixed contract insofar as it provided some
maritime and non-maritime coverage. In determining whether the court
could exercise admiralty jurisdiction to hear the dispute, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals used an approach unlike any of the other Circuit
Courts of Appeal. Unlike either the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, or
the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals took an “all
encompassing” view of the contract, and, rather than focusing on the
237. Id. at 1214.
238. Unlike the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the First and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeals have held that the doctrine of uberrimea fidei is a well-entrenched federal
precedent, and failure to disclose material facts may have the effect of causing a marine
insurance policy to be void. See Catlin (Syndicate 2003) at Lloyd’s v. San Juan Towing
and Marine Services, Inc., 974 F. Supp. 2d 64, 75 (1st Cir. 2015); see also Certain
Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Inlet Fisheries Inc., 518 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2008).
239. Sentry Select Ins. Co., 481 F.3d at 1216.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1216-17.
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policy coverage or the interests insured, the Court looked at the entire
policy holistically to determine if the “primary or principal objective of
the contract is the establishment of policies of marine insurance.”242 In
utilizing this holistic approach, the Court noted that the only maritime
portion of the excess coverage provided by the “Big Shield” policy was
that contained in the MEL endorsement.243 The Court went on to explain
that, while the MEL endorsement provided coverage for “bodily injury to
a master or member of the crew of a vessel, the description of the work
covered under the MEL” was “confined to the typical shore-side
activities of ‘[p]ainting and/or scrubbing of decks of tugs or barges, and
loading and unloading as applicable in Washington and Alaska.’”244 As a
result, given the totality of the contract, the excess policy’s primary
objective was not maritime commerce, and, as a result, the court did not
have original admiralty jurisdiction to hear the dispute over the excess
policy’s coverage.245
As can be seen by the above brief explanation of Sentry Select
Insurance Co.,246 the Ninth Circuit lacks a definable test. Whereas the
Ninth Circuit sort of determines the saltiness247 of the contract using a
“primary objective”-type test which sort of seeks to determine the scope
of the contract by looking at coverages, the Court does not actually come
up with a distinctive test that looks at concrete factors such as 1) the
nature of the dispute, 2) the scope of coverage as is specified on the four
corners of the policy, or even 3) interests insured. This is an altogether
undesirable methodology because this approach makes it impossible to
predict whether or not a court will exercise its admiralty jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSION
The jurisdictional test handed down by the Supreme Court in Norfolk
Southern Railway v. Kirby248 should be limited in its application to mixed
contracts involving multi-modal transportation and/or warehouse-towarehouse marine open cargo policies. This is the case as these sorts of
mixed contracts have objective geographically definable elements to
them and the significance of maritime elements are apparent. Thus, the
Kirby test is viable and provides practitioners and commercial men a
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
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level of uniformity and predictability that is desirable in maritime
commerce.
Moreover, Kirby may even be applied to a certain extent in
determining whether a dispute over a master service agreement meets the
jurisdictional requirements for admiralty jurisdiction. This is the case as
the Fifth Circuit’s “focus-of-the-contract test”249 holistically looks to the
gist of the contract to determine where a majority of the work was
contemplated, and based on this finding, the court determines whether
the contract is or is not a maritime contract justifying the exercise of its
admiralty jurisdiction. Given the difficulty presented in applying the
Kirby test to determine whether the court has admiralty jurisdiction over
a mixed contract such as a master service agreement, a contract that lacks
the spatial or geographic elements inherent in multi-modal transportation
contracts and warehouse to warehouse marine cargo insurance policies, it
appears that the Fifth Circuit approach is the best test for determining
admiralty jurisdiction because the test focuses on the four corners of the
contract to determine whether the maritime elements are significant
enough to justify the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction by looking at
where a majority of the work to be completed is contemplated. With this
particular test, parties to the contract may very easily forecast whether a
dispute will be subject to the court’s admiralty jurisdiction and whether
or not the parties to the contract will have access to, or must deal with,
substantive law and procedural rules unique to admiralty.
Whereas the Fifth Circuit basically occupies the field with regard to
admiralty jurisdictional analysis with regard to master service
agreements, the jurisprudence regarding marine insurance umbrella
policies is all over the map. This is the case because the Kirby
jurisdictional test is completely inappropriate for more amorphous mixed
contracts that lack an objective, geographically-definable element or
some other overt objective element on which to focus, such as marine
insurance umbrella policies. When it comes to marine insurance umbrella
policies, it seems as though each circuit has its own jurisdictional test.
Given this fact, the Courts have done an altogether inadequate job in
formulating a cohesive and predictable rule or set of rules with which it
determines what marine insurance contracts, that provide both sea-side
and shore-side risk coverage, are sufficiently “salty”250 to justify the
exercise of admiralty jurisdiction for resolving controversies arising from
such policies. Moreover, given the magnitude of the implications
249. Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC., 589 F.3d 778, 787 (5th Cir.
2009).
250. Kossick, 365 U.S. at 742.
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associated with the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction in resolution
contractual disputes, such as the use of general maritime law or the
availability of procedural devices, the court has done the maritime
industry a great disservice in its failure of the aforementioned.
When looking at the different approaches employed by the different
circuits, it seems as though the Second Circuit approach makes the most
sense. As a recap, the Second Circuit employs a two prong test, first
inquiring into the nature of the dispute as a threshold inquiry, and then,
only after satisfying itself that the underlying dispute was maritime, the
court next determines the significance of the maritime elements of the
policy by examining the actual coverages specified in the policy. This
approach is arguably the best post-Kirby test employed by any of the
Circuits because all insurance coverage disputes involve an underlying
dispute, and the Second Circuit’s threshold inquiry into the nature of the
dispute ensures maritime issues are properly adjudicated as such. This
threshold inquiry prevents odd and anomalous results. Moreover, even
after the underlying dispute has been determined to be maritime, the
court’s second prong goes even further to ensure that the court accurately
designates a particular policy as maritime or not by examining the policy
coverage on the four corners of the document. So, as can be seen, the
Second Circuit approach provides predictability through common sense
and consequently also uniformity in the application of federal maritime
law. This two prong jurisdictional test ensures maritime matters remain
before a court sitting in admiralty and vice versa.
In summation, in pursuit of the overarching goal of uniformity in the
application of admiralty jurisdiction and maritime law, the Kirby test
should be limited in application to only those mixed contracts that have
some definite and objective element upon which courts are able to focus,
such as multi-modal transportation contracts, warehouse to warehouse
marine cargo insurance policies, or master service agreements.
Moreover, with regard to master service agreements or blanket contracts,
if given the opportunity, the other circuits should adopt a test similar to
that of Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. as propagated by the Fifth Circuit.
Finally, the multiplicity of jurisdictional tests associated with whether the
courts may exercise admiralty jurisdiction in order to hear disputes
arising out of marine insurance umbrella policies covering sea-side and
shore-side risks is an undesirable result of Kirby, and the Supreme Court
should resolve the disparate circuit split in favor of a test that is similar to
that employed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.

